Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments
Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2005
Volume 60, Issue 1, pages 63–77, March 2006
How to Cite
Janvid, M. (2006), Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica, 60: 63–77. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01018.x
- Issue online: 28 JUN 2005
- Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2005
In this paper a candidate for a rational reconstruction of skeptical arguments is presented and defended against a competitor called ‘The Argument from Ignorance’. On the basis of this defense, Michael Williams’ claims that foundationalism and epistemological realism serve as presuppositions for skepticism are criticized. It is argued that rejecting these two theses, as his version of contextualism does, is not sufficient for answering the skeptical challenge.