Meaning-Scepticism and Analyticity
Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2005
Volume 59, Issue 3, pages 357–365, September 2005
How to Cite
Philie, P. (2005), Meaning-Scepticism and Analyticity. Dialectica, 59: 357–365. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01020.x
- Issue online: 28 JUN 2005
- Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2005
In his paper ‘Analyticity’, Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that non-factualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning – and this shows that Quine's argument can’t be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine's argument, properly interpreted, has a more limited scope than is generally believed and that it leaves the door open to non-Platonistic accounts of meaning.