Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non-Transferability
Version of Record online: 26 JAN 2006
Volume 60, Issue 2, pages 99–113, June 2006
How to Cite
Cameron, R. (2006), Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non-Transferability. Dialectica, 60: 99–113. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01050.x
- Issue online: 26 JAN 2006
- Version of Record online: 26 JAN 2006
In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the substance-attribute theory of tropes. I distinguish first between three versions of the non-transferability of a trope from the substratum in which it inheres and then between two versions of the denial of necessary connections. I show that the most plausible combination of these views is consistent. In section two I consider an objection to the bundle theory using the Humean doctrine that is advanced by Armstrong, and argue that it is unconvincing. In section three I return to the version of non-transferability that would cause obvious trouble for a substance-attribute theory, and less obvious trouble for a bundle theory. I argue that there is independent reason to reject this principle since, given a perdurantist metaphysic, it does not in fact secure what appeared to be its only benefit: namely that it allows tropes to act as truthmakers. I conclude that there is no objection to trope theory per se on the grounds that it brings commitment to necessary connections.