Is ‘Everything’ Precise?
Version of Record online: 25 SEP 2006
Volume 60, Issue 4, pages 397–409, December 2006
How to Cite
Lópezde Sa, D. (2006), Is ‘Everything’ Precise?. Dialectica, 60: 397–409. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01077.x
- Issue online: 6 DEC 2006
- Version of Record online: 25 SEP 2006
There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected.