Version of Record online: 22 JUL 2010
© 2010 The Author. dialectica© 2010 Editorial Board of dialectica
Volume 64, Issue 3, pages 313–333, September 2010
How to Cite
Henden, E. (2010), Deliberation Incompatibilism. Dialectica, 64: 313–333. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01234.x
- Issue online: 22 JUL 2010
- Version of Record online: 22 JUL 2010
Deliberation incompatibilism is the view that an agent being rational and deliberating about which of (mutually excluding) actions to perform, is incompatible with her believing that there exist prior conditions that render impossible the performance of either one of these actions. However, the main argument for this view, associated most prominently with Peter van Inwagen, appears to have been widely rejected by contemporary authors on free will. In this paper I argue first that a closer examination of van Inwagen's argument shows that the standard objections are based on a misunderstanding of the notion of ‘deliberation’ presupposed in this argument. Second, I attempt to strengthen the case for deliberation incompatibilism by offering a different argument in its support.