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Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology

  1. Uriah KRIEGEL

Article first published online: 23 MAY 2011

DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01262.x

Issue

Dialectica

Dialectica

Volume 65, Issue 2, pages 177–204, June 2011

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How to Cite

KRIEGEL, U. (2011), Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology. Dialectica, 65: 177–204. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01262.x

Author Information

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA; Email: theuriah@gmail.com

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 23 MAY 2011
  2. Article first published online: 23 MAY 2011

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