On Neutral Relations
Article first published online: 23 FEB 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01294.x
© 2012 The Authors. dialectica© 2012 Editorial Board of dialectica
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How to Cite
GASKIN, R. and HILL, D. J. (2012), On Neutral Relations. Dialectica, 66: 167–186. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01294.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 23 FEB 2012
- Article first published online: 23 FEB 2012
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Abstract
Is there an explanation of why the state of x's bearing the non-symmetric binary relation R to y is different from its differential opposite, the state of y's bearing R to x? One traditional view has it that the explanation is that non-symmetric relations hold of objects in an essentially directional way, ordering the relevant relata. We call this view ‘directionalism’. Kit Fine has suggested that this approach is subject to significant metaphysical difficulties, sufficient to motivate seeking an alternative analysis. He considers two such alternative explanations, which he labels ‘positionalism’ and ‘anti-positionalism’. Of these he endorses the latter. We argue that anti-positionalism fails to provide a coherent explanation of the distinction between differential opposites, and that one should simply hold the minimalist position that there is no explanation for this metaphysical difference.

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