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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno
Article first published online: 24 MAY 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x
© 2012 The Authors. dialectica© 2012 Editorial Board of dialectica
Issue
Dialectica
Special Issue: Paolo Casalegno's Good Points. Guest Editor: Elisa Paganini
Volume 66, Issue 2, pages 289–297, June 2012
Additional Information
How to Cite
DOUVEN, I. and KELP, C. (2012), In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno. Dialectica, 66: 289–297. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 24 MAY 2012
- Article first published online: 24 MAY 2012
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Abstract
A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.