I am most grateful to John Rawls, who read a previous draft of the article and saved me from important mistakes. Needless to say, all mistakes are my responsibility. Thanks also to Arizona State University College of Law for providing me with summer research support.
The Rawlsian Theory of International Law
Version of Record online: 11 APR 2006
Ethics & International Affairs
Volume 9, Issue 1, pages 79–99, March 1995
How to Cite
Tesón, F. R. (1995), The Rawlsian Theory of International Law. Ethics & International Affairs, 9: 79–99. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.1995.tb00172.x
- Issue online: 11 APR 2006
- Version of Record online: 11 APR 2006
Teson critiques a recent article by John Rawls in which Rawls extends his acclaimed political theory to include international relations. Teson first summarizes Rawls' theory and then presents a critique. With this essay, Rawls joins an already vigorous scholarly reaction against traditional state-centered models of international law and relations. When measured against such models, Rawls' theory of international law moves in the right direction in assigning a role, albeit a modest one, to human rights and political legitimacy. However, to the extent that Rawls' effort purports to be a rational reconstruction of international law for our new era (as he certainly intends it to be), it fails to capture central moral features of the international order. His proposal is still too forgiving of serious forms of oppression in the name of liberal tolerance. The theory thus falls short of matching the considered moral judgments prevailing in today's international community. Moreover, it fails Rawls' own test of epistemic adequacy.