Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism
Article first published online: 22 JUN 2006
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00030.x
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How to Cite
Machery, E. (2006), Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism. Philosophy Compass, 1: 398–412. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00030.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 22 JUN 2006
- Article first published online: 22 JUN 2006
- Philosophy Compass 1/4 (2006): 398–412, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00030.x
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Abstract
This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo-empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries-old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo-empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo-empiricism are not as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo-empiricism is discussed in detail.