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Fictional Characters
Article first published online: 31 JAN 2007
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00059.x
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How to Cite
Friend, S. (2007), Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass, 2: 141–156. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00059.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 31 JAN 2007
- Article first published online: 31 JAN 2007
- Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007): 141–156, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00059.x
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Abstract
If there are no fictional characters, how do we explain thought and discourse apparently about them? If there are, what are they like? A growing number of philosophers claim that fictional characters are abstract objects akin to novels or plots. They argue that postulating characters provides the most straightforward explanation of our literary practices as well as a uniform account of discourse and thought about fiction. Anti-realists counter that postulation is neither necessary nor straightforward, and that the invocation of pretense provides a better account of the same phenomena. I outline and assess these competing theories.