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What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)
Article first published online: 5 MAR 2007
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.x
Additional Information
How to Cite
Leitgeb, H. (2007), What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be). Philosophy Compass, 2: 276–290. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 5 MAR 2007
- Article first published online: 5 MAR 2007
- Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007): 276–290, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.x
- Abstract
- Article
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- Cited By
Abstract
This article outlines what a formal theory of truth should be like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages.