Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?
Article first published online: 7 DEC 2007
© 2007 The Author
Volume 3, Issue 1, pages 93–118, January 2008
How to Cite
Brogaard, B. (2008), Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?. Philosophy Compass, 3: 93–118. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00118.x
- Issue published online: 7 DEC 2007
- Article first published online: 7 DEC 2007
- Philosophy Compass 3/1 (2008): 93–118, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00118.x
Attitude reports are reports about people's states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude reports are successful. Some hold that it is specification of the precise content of a mental state; others hold that it is specification of the content of a mental state only relative to a mode of presentation; yet others hold that it is merely a description or characterization of the content of a mental state. After providing a brief introduction to the traditional debate on attitude reports, this entry argues that for certain kinds of knowledge reports and for so-called de re attitude reports, descriptive theories emerge as the most plausible. The entry concludes with a discussion of how the characterizing relation between attitude reports and mental states might be construed.