Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Article first published online: 12 JAN 2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00197.x
© 2009 The Authors. Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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How to Cite
Levy, N. and McKenna, M. (2009), Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 4: 96–133. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00197.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 21 JAN 2009
- Article first published online: 12 JAN 2009
- Philosophy Compass 4/1 (2009): 96–133, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00197.x
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Abstract
In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck.

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