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The Problem of Natural Evil I: General Theistic Replies
Article first published online: 27 MAY 2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00209.x
© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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How to Cite
Gelinas, L. (2009), The Problem of Natural Evil I: General Theistic Replies. Philosophy Compass, 4: 533–559. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00209.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 27 MAY 2009
- Article first published online: 27 MAY 2009
- Philosophy Compass 4/3 (2009): 533–559, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00209.x
- Abstract
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Abstract
I examine different strategies involved in stating anti-theistic arguments from natural evil, and consider some theistic replies. There are, traditionally, two main types of arguments from natural evil: those that purport to deduce a contradiction between the existence of natural evil and the existence of God, and those that claim that the existence of certain types or quantities of natural evil significantly lowers the probability that theism is true. After considering peripheral replies, I state four prominent theistic rebutting strategies: skeptical theism; Richard Swinburne's view that moral knowledge entails natural evil; the soul-making theodicy; and the natural law theodicy.