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The Problem of Natural Evil II: Hybrid Replies
Article first published online: 27 MAY 2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00210.x
© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Additional Information
How to Cite
Gelinas, L. (2009), The Problem of Natural Evil II: Hybrid Replies. Philosophy Compass, 4: 560–574. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00210.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 27 MAY 2009
- Article first published online: 27 MAY 2009
- Philosophy Compass 4/3 (2009): 560–574, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00210.x
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Abstract
I consider two views that combine different elements of general theistic replies to natural evil, those of Peter van Inwagen and William Hasker. I end with a Hasker-style defense – one that, unlike Hasker's, denies the existence of pointless natural evils – and some brief observations on the direction of future debate.