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Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Article first published online: 2 APR 2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x
© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Additional Information
How to Cite
Piccinini, G. (2009), Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass, 4: 515–532. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 27 MAY 2009
- Article first published online: 2 APR 2009
- Philosophy Compass 4/3 (2009): 515–532, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Abstract
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done.