The Grounds of Necessity
Article first published online: 7 APR 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00296.x
© 2010 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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How to Cite
Cameron, R. P. (2010), The Grounds of Necessity. Philosophy Compass, 5: 348–358. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00296.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 7 APR 2010
- Article first published online: 7 APR 2010
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Abstract
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What’s so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis’ reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine’s reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of necessity that take the distinction between the necessary and the contingent to be a matter of convention.

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