Version of Record online: 5 OCT 2010
© 2010 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume 5, Issue 10, pages 840–853, October 2010
How to Cite
Madison, B. (2010), Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass, 5: 840–853. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00333.x
- Issue online: 5 OCT 2010
- Version of Record online: 5 OCT 2010
The internalism/externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, is that all the relevant factors that determine justification must be ‘internal’ (in a sense that needs to be specified). Epistemic externalism is the denial of internalism. Epistemic internalism about justification is the subject of this article. After introducing the central intuitive considerations that have tended to motivate internalism, this paper will explore different ways of construing the internalist position (or family of positions). In addition to classical formulations, more recent formulations will be discussed, concluding with a discussion of an emerging position known as ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism’, which its advocates claim preserves the most important features of more traditional forms of internalism, while avoiding their difficulties. Epistemological Disjunctivism is particularly worthy of attention since if true, it promises to bridge internalist and externalist epistemologies, bringing a rapprochement to two sides of what may otherwise appear a deep and intractable debate about the fundamental nature of epistemology.