Version of Record online: 22 DEC 2011
© 2011 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume 6, Issue 12, pages 912–921, December 2011
How to Cite
Nottelmann, N. (2011), Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass, 6: 912–921. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00446.x
- Issue online: 22 DEC 2011
- Version of Record online: 22 DEC 2011
Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.