Article first published online: 22 AUG 2012
© 2012 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume 7, Issue 9, pages 585–596, September 2012
How to Cite
Reed, B. (2012), Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass, 7: 585–596. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00502.x
- Issue published online: 22 AUG 2012
- Article first published online: 22 AUG 2012
Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully general account of the view. I conclude by looking at the two major difficulties for fallibilism: the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox.