Agency under constraint: Ideological preferences and the politics of electricity regulation in Latin America
Version of Record online: 14 JUL 2011
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd
Regulation & Governance
Volume 5, Issue 3, pages 350–367, September 2011
How to Cite
Martinez-Gallardo, C. and Murillo, M. V. (2011), Agency under constraint: Ideological preferences and the politics of electricity regulation in Latin America. Regulation & Governance, 5: 350–367. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01114.x
- Issue online: 1 AUG 2011
- Version of Record online: 14 JUL 2011
- Accepted for publication 6 June 2011.
Table A.1 Definition and sources for independent variables.
Table A.2 Description of independent variables.
Table A.3 Variations on the index of regulatory content.
Table A.4 Effect of statist legacy on regulatory control (OLS for countries that privatized).
Table A.5 Regulatory choice as multinomial logit.
Table A.6 Models of regulatory choice (Multinomial logit).
|REGO_1114_sm_Appendix.docx||28K||Supporting info item|
Please note: Wiley Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.