We wish to thank Bill Christie (the editor) and an anonymous referee for the great criticism and suggestions, and Wendy Jennings and Nancy MacMillan for the wonderful editorial help. We are grateful to the participants in the 2008 CCGR Conference in Oslo, the 2007 European Financial Management Association Meetings in Vienna, the 2007 SGF Conference at the SWX Swiss Exchange in Zurich, the 2007 SSES Annual Meeting at the Universität St. Gallen, the 2007 Campus for Finance Conference at WHU University in Koblenz, the 2006 IFM Conference on Corporate Governance in Family/Unlisted Firms in Thun, and the 2006 BWL Brown Bag Seminar at the Universität Bern for their comments. We also benefited from the thoughtful criticism of Suranjita Mukherjee, Carolina Salvà, Richard Priestley (especially), Øyvind Bøhren, Vladimir Atanosov, Najah Attig, Eliezer M. Fich, Zsuzsanna Fluck, Diego Liechti, Christian Lüthje, John McConnell, Øyvind Norli, Urs Peyer, Stefan Prigge, Lukas Roth, Ulf Schiller, Per Strömberg, and Norbert Thom. We are indebted to Stefan Leuthold, Markus Senn, and Jonas Zeller for research assistance. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. This article represents the views of the authors and all errors are ours. An earlier version of this paper entitled “Protecting Minority Investors: Listed versus Unlisted Firms” was published in the ECGI Finance Working Paper series (No. 133/2006).
Protecting Minority Shareholders: Listed versus Unlisted Firms
Version of Record online: 31 MAR 2010
© 2010 Financial Management Association International
Volume 39, Issue 1, pages 33–57, Spring 2010
How to Cite
Loderer, C. and Waelchli, U. (2010), Protecting Minority Shareholders: Listed versus Unlisted Firms. Financial Management, 39: 33–57. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2009.01065.x
- Issue online: 31 MAR 2010
- Version of Record online: 31 MAR 2010
Listed firms have an incentive to render themselves attractive to investors at large. This paper examines whether listed and unlisted firms differ in their care for minority shareholders and finds supporting evidence. We examine control structure, disclosure, board architecture and processes, and director compensation. The corporate governance package in listed firms differs from that in unlisted firms in terms of levels and mix of the different provisions. The data also suggest that listed firms perform better.