This paper has benefited significantly from a number of comments. I owe particular thanks to Bill Brewer, John Broome, Roger Crisp, Sven Nyholm. Jeff Speaks, Wlodek Rabinowicz, and two anonymous referees for Theoriu. I have also benefited from comments given at presentations of this work in a slightly different form at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar and in much the present form at the Canadian Society for Epistemology's International Symposium on Rationality in Contemporary Epistemology.
Evidentialism and the Numbers Game1
Version of Record online: 10 OCT 2008
© 2007 Stiftelsen Theoria
Volume 73, Issue 4, pages 304–316, December 2007
How to Cite
REISNER, A. E. (2007), Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria, 73: 304–316. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01210.x
- Issue online: 10 OCT 2008
- Version of Record online: 10 OCT 2008
Abstract: This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certain circumstances, evidentialism is unable to generate the correct reasons for belief; these reasons can only be provided by other kinds of epistemic reasons apart from evidential ones. I am not arguing that reasons in ordinary cases for belief are non-evidential, but that evidentialism is too narrow an account of normative reasons for belief to serve as a complete theory of epistemic reasons.