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Taking Referentialism Seriously: A Response to the Modal Argument
Article first published online: 5 JAN 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01058.x
© 2010 Stiftelsen Theoria. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Additional Information
How to Cite
O'SULLIVAN, B. (2010), Taking Referentialism Seriously: A Response to the Modal Argument. Theoria, 76: 54–67. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01058.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 5 JAN 2010
- Article first published online: 5 JAN 2010
- Abstract
- Article
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Keywords:
- modal argument;
- phenomenal concepts;
- metaconceptual move;
- Saul Kripke;
- David Chalmers;
- John Perry
Abstract
I argue that an identity theorist can successfully resist a Kripkean modal argument by employing what I call a metaconceptual move. Furthermore, by showing how this move fails to apply straightforwardly to Chalmers' argument, I clarify the nature of the threat presented by Chalmers and how it differs from a Kripkean modal argument.