William Heytesbury and the Conditions for Knowledge
Article first published online: 25 NOV 2010
© 2010 Stiftelsen Theoria. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Volume 76, Issue 4, pages 355–374, December 2010
How to Cite
MARTENS, D. B. (2010), William Heytesbury and the Conditions for Knowledge. Theoria, 76: 355–374. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01082.x
- Issue published online: 25 NOV 2010
- Article first published online: 25 NOV 2010
- conditions for knowledge;
- definition of knowledge;
- medieval epistemic logic
Ivan Boh affirms and Robert Pasnau denies that William Heytesbury holds merely true belief to be sufficient for knowledge in the broad sense. I argue that Boh is correct and Pasnau is mistaken, and that there is a long-running orthodox medieval tradition agreeing with Heytesbury about the conditions for knowledge. I offer a hypothesis about the origins, continuance and demise of that medieval tradition, and some remarks about the tradition's significance.