Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?
Version of Record online: 29 FEB 2012
© 2012 Stiftelsen Theoria
Volume 78, Issue 2, pages 115–127, May 2012
How to Cite
FRENCH, C. (2012), Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?. Theoria, 78: 115–127. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01130.x
- Issue online: 13 APR 2012
- Version of Record online: 29 FEB 2012
- propositional seeing;
- propositional knowledge;
- factive states
In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts “see” does not have the sort of meaning (a purely perceptual meaning) which would sustain Turri's claims about the cases he offers (specifically, the (A) verdicts).