A preliminary version of this paper has circulated under the title “On the virtues of the ascendingprice auction: New insights in the private value setting”. We are grateful to Paul Milgrom for helpful suggestions on this preliminary version, and we thank seminar participants at Southampton, Nuffield College (Oxford), Insead and Mannheim University for helpful comments. The comments of a coeditor and anonymous referees were also very helpful. The second author acknowledges the support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research Centre for Economic Learningand Social Evolution.
Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?
Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2008
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 38, Issue 2, pages 355–372, June 2007
How to Cite
Compte, O. and Jehiel, P. (2007), Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?. The RAND Journal of Economics, 38: 355–372. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00072.x
- Issue online: 16 SEP 2008
- Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2008
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