I thank Hongbin Cai, Ig Horstmann, Maria Rotundo, Chuck Thomas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
Teams versus individual accountability: solving multitask problems through job design
Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2008
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 38, Issue 2, pages 467–479, June 2007
How to Cite
Corts, K. S. (2007), Teams versus individual accountability: solving multitask problems through job design. The RAND Journal of Economics, 38: 467–479. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00078.x
- Issue online: 16 SEP 2008
- Version of Record online: 28 JUN 2008
Many organizations are structured so that workers are jointly accountable for performance, even though there exist alternative organizational structures that align incentive compensation more closely with each worker's tasks. I develop a multitask agency model that demonstrates that such organizations may be optimal when multitask problems are severe or risk considerations are not too important. I also show that, in some circumstances, it may be optimal to share poorly measured tasks among several agents, contrary to the results of the existing multitask literature.