I am very grateful to Mathias Dewatripont, Marco Becht, Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart, Paola Conconi, Mariassunta Giannetti, Sergei Guriev, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions, and Ira Kirysheva for excellent research assistance. I also would like to thank seminar participants at ECARES (Université Libre de Bruxelles), Stockholm SITE and SIFR, New Economic School, Universidad de Navarra, BI Norwegian School of Management, and University of Aarhus, workshop participants at Columbia Law School, and participants of the 21st EEA Annual Congress and of the conference in tribute to Jean-Jacques Laffont.
Shareholder access to manager-biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade-off
Article first published online: 3 MAY 2010
© 2010, RAND
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 41, Issue 2, pages 270–300, Summer 2010
How to Cite
Stepanov, S. (2010), Shareholder access to manager-biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade-off. The RAND Journal of Economics, 41: 270–300. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00100.x
- Issue published online: 3 MAY 2010
- Article first published online: 3 MAY 2010
Options for accessing this content:
- Login via other institutional login options http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/login-options.
- You can purchase online access to this Article for a 24-hour period (price varies by title)
- New Users: Please register, then proceed to purchase the article.
Registered Users please login:
- Access your saved publications, articles and searches
- Manage your email alerts, orders and subscriptions
- Change your contact information, including your password
Please register to:
- Save publications, articles and searches
- Get email alerts
- Get all the benefits mentioned below!