We thank Jim Anton, Daniel Bare, Özlem Bedre-Defolie, Leslie Marx, Debashis Pal, and seminar participants at the University of Cincinnati as well as at the 2011 International IO and 2011 Midwest Theory Conferences. We are especially grateful to David Martimort (the coeditor) and the referees for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours.
Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations
Article first published online: 16 OCT 2012
© 2012, RAND.
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 43, Issue 3, pages 514–536, Fall 2012
How to Cite
Krasteva, S. and Yildirim, H. (2012), Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations. The RAND Journal of Economics, 43: 514–536. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00184.x
- Issue published online: 16 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 16 OCT 2012
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