Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations
Version of Record online: 13 MAY 2010
Copyright © 2010 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Topics in Cognitive Science
Volume 2, Issue 3, pages 511–527, July 2010
How to Cite
Paxton, J. M. and Greene, J. D. (2010), Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2: 511–527. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01096.x
- Issue online: 9 JUL 2010
- Version of Record online: 13 MAY 2010
- Received 17 June 2009; received in revised form 05 November 2009; accepted 27 January 2010
- Dual-process model;
- Moral judgment;
- Moral reasoning;
- Social intuitionist model
Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias that would otherwise dominate behavior. We argue that little is known about the psychology of moral reasoning and that it may yet prove to be a potent social force.