1756-8765/asset/TOPS_left.gif?v=1&s=d566d0ec7a809774bd100974244dce3e582e54f6)
1756-8765/asset/TOPS_right.gif?v=1&s=9810b49e49ffd9b5a5b4807617cb10019d454ef6)
The Elusive Experience of Agency
Article first published online: 9 MAR 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01132.x
Copyright © 2011 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Additional Information
How to Cite
Briscoe, R. E. (2011), The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3: 262–267. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01132.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 6 APR 2011
- Article first published online: 9 MAR 2011
- Received 26 May 2010; received in revised form 3 September 2010; accepted 26 September 2010
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- Will;
- Agency;
- Agentive experience;
- Motor control;
- Forward models;
- Comparators;
- Action monitoring;
- Consciousness
Abstract
I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against actual sensory feedback are also coded in a perceptual representational format.