Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?
Version of Record online: 9 MAR 2011
Copyright © 2011 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Topics in Cognitive Science
Volume 3, Issue 2, pages 268–272, April 2011
How to Cite
Mylopoulos, M. I. (2011), Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3: 268–272. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01136.x
- Issue online: 6 APR 2011
- Version of Record online: 9 MAR 2011
- Received 31 May 2010; received in revised form 13 September 2010; accepted 26 September 2010
- Motor control;
- Sense of control;
- Forward model
Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are reasons to favor a motor theory of control consciousness over a sensory imagery theory.