Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science

Authors


should be sent to Nigel Stepp, Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut, 406 Babbidge Rd, U-1020 Storrs, CT 06269-1020. E-mail: nigel.stepp@uconn.edu

Abstract

Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel’s (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.

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