Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science
Article first published online: 6 APR 2011
Copyright © 2011 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Topics in Cognitive Science
Volume 3, Issue 2, pages 425–437, April 2011
How to Cite
Stepp, N., Chemero, A. and Turvey, M. T. (2011), Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3: 425–437. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x
- Issue published online: 6 APR 2011
- Article first published online: 6 APR 2011
- Received 20 December 2009; received in revised form 18 May 2010; accepted 18 May 2010
- Dynamical systems;
- Philosophy of science
Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel’s (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.