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Insider Trading and Earnings Management in Distressed Firms†

  1. Messod D. Beneish1,
  2. Eric Press2,
  3. Mark E. Vargus3

Article first published online: 19 JUL 2011

DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01084.x

Issue

Contemporary Accounting Research

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volume 29, Issue 1, pages 191–220, Spring 2012 (March)

Additional Information

How to Cite

Beneish, M. D., Press, E. and Vargus, M. E. (2012), Insider Trading and Earnings Management in Distressed Firms. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29: 191–220. doi: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01084.x

Author Information

  1. 1

    Indiana University

  2. 2

    Temple University

  3. 3

    Drexel University

  1. †

     Accepted by Peter Clarkson. We wish to thank Peter Clarkson (associate editor) and two anonymous referees. We benefited from helpful comments and discussions with Steve Balsam, Anne Beatty, Walt Blacconiere, Jim Boatsman, David Burgstahler, Natasha Burns, Morris Danielson, Mark DeFond, Joel Demski, Peter Easton, Dan Givoly, Nick Gonedes, Bin Ke, S.P. Kothari, Jagan Krishnan, Jayanthi Krishnan, Laureen Maines, Ram Natarajan, Jim Ohlson, Jamie Pratt, Dahlia Robinson, Jerry Salamon, Geoff Sprinkle, Nathan Stuart, Seow Hong Teoh, Matt Wieland, and workshop participants at Arizona State University, Baruch-CUNY, University of Connecticut, University of Florida, Indiana University, Ohio State University, Penn State University, University of Southern California, Temple University, University of Texas at Dallas, participants at the 2005 HKUST Summer Symposium on Accounting Research, and members of the SEC Office of Economic Analysis.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 6 APR 2012
  2. Article first published online: 19 JUL 2011
  3. Accepted manuscript online: 21 FEB 2011 12:08PM EST

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