I thank Rae Langton, Brian Weatherson, and John Hawthorne for valuable comments. Note that here, except when I discuss our jointly authored papers, I speak for myself and not for Langton; 1 do not know how far she would agree with me.
Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 63, Issue 2, pages 381–398, September 2001
How to Cite
LEWIS, D. (2001), Redefining ‘Intrinsic’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381–398. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00111.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
- Cited By
Several alleged counterexamples to the definition of ‘intrinsic’ proposed in Rae Langton and David Lewis,‘Defining “Intrinsic”’, are unconvincing. Yet there are reasons for dissatisfaction, and room for improvement. One desirable change is to raise the standard of non-disjunctiveness, thereby putting less burden on contentious judgements of comparative naturalness. A second is to deal with spurious independence by throwing out just the disjunctive troublemakers, instead of throwing out disjunctive properties wholesale, and afterward reinstating those impeccably intrinsic disjunctive properties that are not troublemakers. (The second of these changes makes the first more affordable.) A third, suggested by Brian Weatherson, would be to invoke the general principle that the intrinsic and the extrinsic characters of things are independent, rather than relying just on one special case of this principle; but it is none too obvious how to do this.