An earlier version of this paper was given at the University of Auckland and the 1996 APA conference in Brisbane. I am grateful to members of the audiences for their comments, especially David Braddon-Mitchell, David Lewis and Denis Robinson. Special thanks to an anonymous referee for extremely helpful criticisms.
Parts and Pretense*
Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 63, Issue 3, pages 543–560, November 2001
How to Cite
KROON, F. W. (2001), Parts and Pretense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 543–560. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00124.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
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This paper begins with a puzzle about certain temporal expressions: phrases like ‘Jones as he was ten years ago’ and ‘the Jones of ten years ago’. There are reasons to take these as substantival, to be interpreted as terms for temporal parts. But it seems that the same reifying strategy would also force us to countenance a host of less attractive posits, among them fictional counterparts of real things (to correspond to such phrases as ‘Garrison as he was in the movie JFK') and much more. I argue that there is a better way: we need only the idea of pretense or make-believe to make sense of claims embedding such phrases, leaving us with no reason, so far, to accept an ontology of temporal parts.