Editor's note: This special symposium, containing this paper and the two that follow it, derives from a memorial conference in honor of Roderick M. Chisholm held at Brown University in the year 2000.
Self-presentation, Representation and the Self
Article first published online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 64, Issue 2, pages 412–430, March 2002
How to Cite
LEHRER, K. (2002), Self-presentation, Representation and the Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 412–430. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00012.x
- Issue published online: 29 MAY 2007
- Article first published online: 29 MAY 2007
- Cited By
Chisholm held that some states of ourselves are self-presenting and provide a stopping place in the quest for justification. The justification we have for accepting that we are in those states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions about justification. Representation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through themselves in a representational loop. It is a loop of exemplarization wherein the state is used as an exemplar to represent the kind of state it is. The result is that the representation of the state provides the subject with a kind of representation that loops back onto itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality. This form of representation by exemplarization is shown to resolve problems and paradoxes concerning subjectivity, consciousness and the self raised by the writings of Hume, Kierkegaard, Ferrier, Sartre and Frank Jackson.