My thanks to Bob Brandom for many conversations and a joint seminar.
Knowledge and the Internal Revisited1
Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 64, Issue 1, pages 97–105, January 2002
How to Cite
MCDOWELL, J. (2002), Knowledge and the Internal Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 97–105. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00144.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
- Cited By
In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social-perspectival conception of knowledge (and of objectivity in general). But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that P constitutes falsehood-excluding justification for believing that P. That should seem common sense, but it is made unavailable by the inferentialist conception of justification that Brandom takes for granted. So far from realizing my aims, Brandom's social-perspectival conception of knowledge is squarely in the target area of my argument in “Knowledge and the Internal,” which I restate here so as to bring that out.