Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?
Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 64, Issue 3, pages 571–591, May 2002
How to Cite
LEVIN, J. (2002), Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 571–591. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00161.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
In this paper I discuss the claim (advanced in various ways by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers) that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.