Editor's: This special symposium, containing this paper and the two that follow it, derives from a memorial conference in honor of Roderick M. Chisholm held at Brown University in the year 2000.
The Ontological Status of Persons*
Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 65, Issue 2, pages 370–388, September 2002
How to Cite
BAKER, L. R. (2002), The Ontological Status of Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 370–388. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00207.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
- Cited By
Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non-Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by-but not identical to-human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions.
Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true