Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 69, Issue 1, pages 115–137, July 2004
How to Cite
CHASE, J. (2004), Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 115–137. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00386.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
In ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.