Many thanks to Brendan Jackson, David Liebesman, Agustín Rayo, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology*
Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 71, Issue 3, pages 557–579, November 2005
How to Cite
EKLUND, M. (2005), Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 557–579. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00471.x
- Issue online: 29 MAY 2007
- Version of Record online: 29 MAY 2007
In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. the difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. the fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply non-committal—or indifferent—with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances (specifically, with respect to the ontologically committing aspects).