Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?
Article first published online: 1 AUG 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 72, Issue 2, pages 403–417, March 2006
How to Cite
JORDAN, J. (2006), Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 403–417. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00567.x
- Issue published online: 1 AUG 2007
- Article first published online: 1 AUG 2007
The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge concerning the realm of goods, evils, and the connections between values, undermines the judgment that what appears as pointless evil really is pointless. For all we know the suffering of an innocent being, though appearing pointless, in fact leads to a greater good. In this paper I argue that no one who accepts the doctrines of skeptical theism has a principled way of avoiding moral skepticism.