I thank Nir Eyal, Keith Hyams, Michael Otsuka, and Peter Vallentyne for comments on an earlier draft.
Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley1
Article first published online: 1 AUG 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 72, Issue 2, pages 439–446, March 2006
How to Cite
COHEN, G. A. (2006), Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 439–446. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00571.x
- Issue published online: 1 AUG 2007
- Article first published online: 1 AUG 2007
- Cited By
In Chapter 6 (“Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism”) of her Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Susan Hurley defends two claims: that “the aim to neutralize luck [does not] contribute to identifying and specifying what egalitarianism is”, and that it also provides no “independent non-question-begging reason or justification for egalitarianism” (p. 147). In the present response, I reject the first of Hurley's claims, and I show that the second, while true, lacks polemical force.
I said, in “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice” (Ethics, 1989), that