Thanks to Andrew Bailey, Andrew Brook, Phil Kremer, Slobadon Perovic, and Bill Seager for useful discussion and comments, and to the audience of the Canadian Philosophical Association annual conference in Halifax, N.S., Canada, for further discussion. Many thanks to the anonymous referee for critical comments on an earlier draft that have much improved my discussion.
What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the “Hard Problem”1
Article first published online: 1 AUG 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 72, Issue 3, pages 576–588, May 2006
How to Cite
GARRETT, B. J. (2006), What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the “Hard Problem”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 576–588. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00584.x
- Issue published online: 1 AUG 2007
- Article first published online: 1 AUG 2007
- Cited By
Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.