Article first published online: 20 MAR 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 74, Issue 1, pages 81–110, January 2007
How to Cite
BIRD, A. (2007), Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 81–110. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x
- Issue published online: 20 MAR 2007
- Article first published online: 20 MAR 2007
Traditional approaches to epistemology have sought, unsuccessfully, to define knowledge in terms of justification. I follow Timothy Williamson in arguing that this is misconceived and that we should take knowledge as our fundamental epistemological notion. We can then characterise justification as a certain sort of approximation to knowledge. A judgement is justified if and only if the reason (if there is one) for a failure to know is to be found outside the subject’s mental states; that is, justified judging is possible knowing (where one world accessible from another if and only if they are identical with regard to a subject’s antecedent mental states and judgement forming processes). This view is explained and defended.