What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?
Article first published online: 6 AUG 2007
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 74, Issue 3, pages 611–634, May 2007
How to Cite
HOPKINS, R. (2007), What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 611–634. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00042.x
- Issue published online: 6 AUG 2007
- Article first published online: 6 AUG 2007
Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct.