How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?
Article first published online: 5 MAY 2008
© 2008 International Phenomenological Society
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 76, Issue 3, pages 547–579, May 2008
How to Cite
ENOCH, D. and SCHECHTER, J. (2008), How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76: 547–579. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x
- Issue published online: 5 MAY 2008
- Article first published online: 5 MAY 2008
In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief-forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.